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Abstract: Why are some countries more prone to social violence than others? Drawing on 
theoretical and empirical insights from the fields of political economy, sociology and 
criminology we develop and empirically test a holistic theory of social violence that accounts 
for political-institutional, socio-economic and socio-demographic factors. We find that hybrid 
political regimes, political-institutional volatility, poverty, inequality and ethnic diversity are 
associated with higher rates of social violence. Unexpectedly, higher rates of economic 
growth are also found to be robustly correlated with higher rates of social violence. 
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Introduction 
In recent years development scholars have devoted substantial attention to understanding the 
causes and consequences of state failure. Most cross-country empirical studies in this genre 
seek to explain the determinants of political violence, such as civil wars and coup d’états. By 
contrast, there are comparatively few studies that address the causes and consequences of 
social violence—i.e. acts of violence between individuals or small groups of individuals that 
do not have an explicitly political motivation. Yet social violence represents a far greater risk 
to human security worldwide than political violence. According to data produced by the 
World Health Organization (WHO), in 2002 there were approximately 170,000 war-related 
deaths and over 500,000 deaths due to interpersonal violence worldwide. In 2004 the counts 
were 182,000 and 598,000 respectively. Moreover, in recent years several authors have noted 
an apparent global decline in armed political conflict since a peak in the early 1990s and a 
concomitant rise in social violence (Fajnzylber et al. 2000; Moser and McIlwaine 2006; 
Rodgers 2009; Harbom and Wallensteen 2009).3 
 
Social violence is not only a direct threat to human security, but also to socio-economic 
development. Acute insecurity has been linked to elevated levels of expenditure on medical 
                                                 
1 Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics & Political Science 
2 Centre for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute Oslo. 
(The authors would like to acknowledge useful comments on this paper made by Jo Beall, Tom Goodfellow, 
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3 It should be noted that Moser and McIlwaine (2006) provide a much more nuanced typology of violence and 
Rodgers (2009) argues that the apparent shift in the nature of violence is merely a change in the manifestation of 
political struggle, and hence the dichotomous categorization used here is false. A more precise definition of 
social violence is provided in the following section, and we return to the question of the line between political 
and social violence in the conclusion.  
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services and law enforcement activities, lost productivity due to injury or premature death, 
reductions in the hours employees are willing to work (e.g. shift work that requires 
individuals to travel at night), higher insurance premiums for firms, and the diversion of 
resources that could be used for investment towards private security provision (Freire and 
Polèse 2003; Soares 2006; WHO 2002). In countries with high rates of social violence these 
direct and indirect costs can add up to a sizable fraction of GDP (ibid). 
 
In this paper we seek to explain why some countries are more prone to social violence than 
others. Drawing together theoretical perspectives and empirical evidence from studies 
produced in the political economy, sociology and criminology traditions, we develop and 
empirically test a holistic model of social violence that accounts for the role of political 
institutions, socio-economic conditions and socio-demographic factors. Our sample of 134 
countries over two years (i.e. 268 observations) has much broader country coverage than 
previous studies, including many more low-income countries. 
 
Our results indicate a strong correlation between ‘hybrid’ and unstable political institutions at 
the national level and high rates of social violence. We also find that a significant amount of 
variation in rates of social violence across countries can be explained by socio-economic and 
socio-demographic factors such as levels of poverty, inequality and ethnic diversity—findings 
which are consistent with previous studies. While the links between poverty, inequality, 
ethnic diversity and social violence are fairly well theorised, the mechanisms linking national-
level political institutions to social violence are less-well understood. 
 
The following section outlines our theory of social violence, summarises the theoretical and 
empirical literature that has sought to identify the determinants of political and criminal 
violence and advances our basic hypotheses. Section 3 outlines the data and the OLS 
specifications that we employ to test these hypotheses. Section 4 summarises our empirical 
results. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the theoretical and empirical challenges of 
advancing our understanding of the determinants of social violence. 
 
 
Towards a Theory of Social Violence 
We define social violence as acts of violence committed by individuals or groups that do not 
reflect an attempt to contest government authority. Examples include individual assaults, 
homicides, gang violence and communal violence. This definition contrasts with that of 
political violence, which we understand to be perpetrated by organised groups of armed 
individuals with the explicit aim of challenging (and, if successful, appropriating) the 
authority of the state to monopolise the legitimate use of violence within its borders. Although 
social violence defined in this way has not been the explicit focus of quantitative empirical 
studies in the past, the works political economists, sociologists and criminologists taken 
together provide fertile ground for developing a theory of social violence and testable 
hypotheses concerning the origins of variation in social violence across countries. 
 
Our general theory consists of three parts.  The first part seeks to explain why people don’t 
behave violently. We assume (pessimistically) that a Hobbesian equilibrium naturally prevails 
and that the absence of violent behaviour in a society therefore requires explanation. We 
propose that the presence of impersonal political-institutional regimes that allocate executive 
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authority in a consistent and predictable manner stimulates the adoption of ‘self-control’ as a 
social norm, reducing overall levels of violence in a society. The second part of our model 
addresses the opposite question: why do people choose to behave violently? As we will see, 
even in contexts where political order is well-established, rates of social violence vary 
significantly over time, and across countries with similar political-institutional characteristics. 
So the first component of the theory is a partial explanation, at best. To answer this second 
question, we focus on socio-economic deprivations and opportunities as motives for 
individuals to violate social norms of self-control. Finally, we consider contextual factors 
related to the socio-demographic characteristics of a population that may have ‘conditioning’ 
effects that interact with the political-institutional and socio-economic factors that influence 
rates of social violence.  
 
Political-institutional configurations and social violence 
One of the key findings of recent research on state failure and civil war is a strong link 
between national level political-institutional configurations (or ‘regime types’) and the 
likelihood of political instability and conflict (Gates et al. 2006; Goldstone et al. 2010; Hegre 
et al. 2001; Hegre and Sambanis 2006). In particular, these studies find that strong democratic 
and strong autocratic regimes are less prone to political instability and violence than weak 
democracies and weak autocracies where institutions governing executive recruitment, 
constraints on the executive and political competition align in ‘inconsistent’ ways (Gates et al. 
2006). In this paper we refer to these intermediate configurations as ‘hybrid’ political 
institutions.  
 
There is an interesting parallel between this finding and those of sociologists and historical 
criminologists seeking to explain variations in homicide rates across countries and over time. 
La Free and Tseloni (2006) find a strong correlation between hybrid political institutions and 
higher homicide rates in a cross-country study employing a sample of 44 countries. And 
Eisner (2001) provides empirical evidence of a secular decline in homicide rates in Western 
European countries over the last several centuries, arguing that the underlying cause of this 
phenomenon relates to the political consolidation of nation states over the same period.  
 
Goldstone et al. (2010) suggest that the link between hybrid political institutions and the 
probability of civil war relates to the ability of states to effectively suppress organised armed 
resistance. They argue that every country contains groups with grievances that may inspire 
rebellion, but that ‘it is where regimes are paralysed or undermined by elite divisions and 
state-elite conflicts that revolutionary wars can be sustained and states lose out to 
insurgencies’ (191). If this logic is extended to more mundane forms of everyday violence, it 
can be argued that hybrid political institutions impede the ability of states to enforce the rule 
of law, hence reducing the credibility of the threat of third-party enforcement for deviance 
that generally encourages individuals (and groups) to internalise the costs of enforcing laws 
by exercising self-control. 
 
An alternative mechanism linking political institutions to social violence was proposed by 
sociologist Norbert Elias (1978) in relation to declining homicide rates in Europe.  In brief, 
Elias proposed that the consolidation of nation states was associated with increasing social 
and economic interdependence among ruling elites, the concomitant development of norms of 
self-control in the upper tiers of society, and the subsequent internalisation of these norms 
 
 
4
among the popular classes. In articulating this causal chain between political order and social 
violence, Elias emphasised the primacy of the process of state formation as the underlying 
cause of the social-psychological changes that ultimately led to lower levels of criminal 
violence (Eisner 2001). 
 
Whether one adopts a political economy perspective stressing the opportunity costs of 
engaging in violent behaviour or a historical-sociological one that emphasises the evolution 
and dissemination of social norms of self-control, the nature of political institutions emerges 
from the literature as a possible determinant of variation in rates of social violence across 
countries. We therefore hypothesise that political-institutional configurations that clearly 
define the terms of executive authority and political competition will be correlated with lower 
levels of social violence across countries.  
 
Socioeconomic conditions and social violence 
However, there is empirical evidence that countries with similar political-institutional regimes 
experience different rates of violence, and that individual countries experience fluctuations in 
rates of violence over time despite stable political-institutional regimes (LaFree and Drass 
2002). This suggests that the political-institutional hypothesis is incomplete. In order to 
account for this variation we turn to theoretical propositions and empirical evidence linking 
socioeconomic conditions to violence. In particular, we focus on the possible effects of 
absolute deprivation (i.e. poverty), relative deprivation (i.e. inequality) and economic 
opportunity.  
 
Empirical studies of the determinants of political violence generally find a positive 
association between poverty and the probability of conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon 
and Laitin 2003; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Goldstone et al. 2000). By contrast, the widely-
hypothesised link between inequality and political conflict has not been robustly established 
in empirical studies. While some authors find inequality is associated with certain conditions 
such as low-level conflict (Alesina and Perotti 1996; Muller and Seligson 1987) or 
humanitarian emergencies (Nafziger and Auvinen 2002), most notable studies find no 
relationship between inequality and civil violence (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and 
Laitin 2003).  However, several authors have noted that different kinds of inequality exist and 
may have differential impacts. In particular, it has been argued that horizontal inequalities 
(i.e. inequality between groups) can lead to the politicisation of group identities and stimulate 
inter-group (as opposed to inter-class) violence (Stewart 2001; Østby 2008). 
 
In the case of criminal violence, the theoretical and empirical links between poverty, 
inequality economic opportunity and violence are more consistent. In a meta-analysis of 214 
quantitative criminological studies, Pratt and Cullen (2005) find strong support for 
hypothesised associations between poverty, inequality and criminality across a variety of 
geographic units (e.g. neighbourhoods, cities, US states). However, there is general 
recognition that poverty and inequality have differential effects. Generally speaking, poverty 
is associated with higher levels of less violent crimes (such as property crimes) while 
inequality is more strongly associated with violent crimes, such as assault and homicide 
(Thorbecke and Charumilind 2002). Several cross-country studies confirm the inequality-
violent crime link (Cole and Gramajo 2009; Fajnzylber et al. 2002b, 2002a), but the poverty-
violent crime link has largely been ignored in the cross-country literature (Pridemore 2008). 
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Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (2000; 2002b, 2002a) found that crime rates tend to be 
countercyclical, suggesting that the growth of licit economic opportunities provided by an 
expanding economy reduces the risk of criminal violence.4 Yet La Free and Drass (2002) 
provide indirect evidence that rapid economic growth and high rates of violence go together. 
In sum, there is strong evidence of a link between inequality and criminal violence, strong 
intra-country evidence of a link between poverty and criminal violence, and inconsistent 
evidence of a link between economic growth and criminal violence. 
 
Theoretically, the relationships between poverty, inequality and economic opportunity (on the 
one hand) and the propensity of individuals or groups to behave violently (on the other) are 
intuitive. Poverty (i.e. absolute deprivation) creates positive incentives for individuals to use 
any means necessary to acquire needed resources and reduces the opportunity cost of using 
risky strategies (such as violence) to do so. Similarly, inequality (i.e. relative deprivation) and 
perceived injustice may inspire individuals or groups to turn on their leaders or each other, 
even if the opportunity costs of doing so are high. And economic opportunity, which offers an 
alternative avenue to a better future and increases the opportunity costs of using violence as a 
means of advancing individual or collective well-being, could be expected to reduce the 
probability of reliance on violent strategies.  
 
Based on these theoretical positions and existing empirical evidence we hypothesise that 
higher levels of poverty and inequality will be associated with higher levels of social 
violence, and that greater economic opportunity will be associated with lower levels of social 
violence. 
 
Socio-demographic factors and social violence 
While political-institutional and socio-economic factors constitute the core of our model, 
theory and evidence suggest that certain socio-demographic factors may exacerbate the risks 
of both political and social violence. Three factors stand out in particular: ethnic diversity, 
population age structure and urbanisation. 
 
Scores of studies in the both the civil war and criminology literatures have investigated a 
hypothesised association between ethnic diversity and violence. In the civil war literature, a 
correlation has been established, but not consistently (Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Laitin 
2007). This may, however, reflect measurement issues given the ‘robust negative relationship 
between social divisions and economic performance’ (Blattman and Miguel 2010 
(forthcoming)) and the theoretical linkages between conflict, ethnicity and inequality 
(Easterly and Levine 1997; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Alesina and Perotti 1996). 
Interestingly, ethnic dominance has been shown to increase the risk of wider civil conflict 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2004), whereas ethnic fractionalisation increases the risk only for low-
level violence (Hegre and Sambanis 2006). This suggests a possible interaction effect 
between inequality and ethnic diversity that hasn’t been explored in the criminology literature 
despite a well-established finding that racial and ethnic diversity increases the probability of 
criminal violence across countries and across geographic units within individual countries 
(Cole and Gramajo 2009; Fajnzylber et al. 2000; Pratt and Cullen 2005). 
                                                 
4 Similarly, civil war studies find that economic growth reduces the probability of conflict (e.g. Collier and 
Hoefler 2004). Theoretically, it is assumed that legitimate economic opportunity raises the opportunity costs of 
engaging in violence.  
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Large youth cohorts may increase the risk of violence. Goldstone (2002) notes that historical 
episodes of political instability and violence have often been associate with the demographic 
phenomenon of ‘youth bulges’—i.e. a period during which there is an unusually high 
proportion of 15-24 year olds relative to adults in a population. Young males in particular are 
the main protagonists in political and criminal violence (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000; 
Mesquida and Wiener 1996; Neapolitan 1997; Neumayer 2003). Theoretically, both 
opportunity and motive perspectives suggest youth bulges may increase risks of violence. 
Large youth cohorts may reduce the opportunity costs of engaging in violence by making 
rebel or gang recruitment easier or more attractive as a livelihood strategy (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004). Sizable youth cohorts may also engender frustration or aggression where 
access to education and job  opportunities are scarce (Cincotta et al. 2003; Goldstone 1991). 
 
The youth bulge theory has found some empirical support in longitudinal cross-country 
studies of political violence (Urdal 2006), but has not been firmly established. Among 
criminologists it is a widely recognised fact that the overwhelming majority of acts of violent 
crime are committed by young men (Neapolitan 1997). Yet there is inconsistent empirical 
evidence of a link between youth bulges and criminal violence in the cross-country literature, 
with some studies finding no effect (Cole and Gramajo 2009; Fajnzylber et al. 2002a) and 
others finding a positive and statistically significant one (Krahn et al. 1986; LaFree and 
Tselsoni 2006; Conklin and Simpson 1985).  
 
Finally, there is a long-hypothesised link between urbanisation and violence. Early 
sociologists such as Weber and Durkheim argued that the social dislocations associated with 
‘modernisation’—i.e. urbanisation and industrialisation—create conditions ripe for social 
violence as traditional social institutions break down and are gradually replaced by ‘modern’ 
(i.e. formal-legal) ones. More recently, scholars have suggested that rapid urban growth may 
create a volatile socio-political atmosphere conducive to violent confrontations between 
individuals and groups as they compete for scarce resources and confront the social strains 
associated with the integration of rural migrants into city life (Cole and Gramajo 2009; 
Goldstone 2002). From a criminological perspective, the generalised anonymity of city living 
is assumed to reduce the probability that a criminal act will result in punishment, and there is 
some evidence from research in the US that larger cities experience higher homicide rates 
than smaller ones or rural areas (Glaeser and Sacerdote 1999). However, the authors of this 
study conclude that the underlying cause is not city size per se but rather that larger cities 
have higher proportions of single-parent households, a finding consistent with the strong 
evidence that ‘family disruption’ is a robust predictor of criminal violence across geographic 
units (Pratt and Cullen 2005). Overall, higher levels of urbanisation have not been robustly 
linked to higher levels of violence, but the relationship between rates of urban growth and 
violence has not been adequately explored in cross-country studies. 
 
Other factors 
There are a handful of other factors that have been shown to be correlated with conflict and 
which we include as controls in our model. Whether or not a country is a significant producer 
of illegal drugs has been found to be correlated with homicide rates (Fajnzylber et al. 2000; 
Fajnzylber et al. 2002a). There is also evidence that countries at war experience higher rates 
of social violence, and that this effect is correlated with the number of battle deaths (Archer 
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and Gartner 1984). Finally, there is a very persistent finding in the criminology literature that 
Latin America and the Caribbean is the most violent region in the world, even when all other 
hypothesised determinants of (criminal) violence are taken into account. However, according 
to our data Sub-Saharan Africa is in fact the most violent region in the world. As both regions 
have substantially higher mean rates of social violence than other major world regions, we 
control for possible regionally-specific effects in each case. 
 
 
Data and Method 
We test the various components of our model individually and then together using OLS 
regression analysis. Our measure of social violence is the number of deaths due to intentional 
injury per 100,000 population as estimated by the WHO’s Global Burden of Disease Project 
(WHO 2004, 2008; Mathers et al. 2003). The WHO distinguishes between deaths that are due 
to self-inflicted injury, violence and war. We use the estimates of deaths due to violence. This 
indicator has been employed in several previous studies as a proxy for national homicide rates 
and is generally considered to be more robust than the widely used homicide statistics 
produced by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The UNODC data is 
based on victimisation surveys which differ widely in their collection methodologies, 
definitions of homicide and reliability.5 By contrast, the WHO data is generated using a 
standardised collection methodology and is based on the reports of medical professionals 
rather that police authorities. It should also be noted that the WHO data is more accurately 
interpreted as an indicator of overall levels of violence in a society than as an indicator of 
homicide rates per se. Deaths due to intentional injury may include everything from a lethal 
bar fight (i.e. manslaughter) to gang violence to premeditated murder. 
 
To date, the WHO has produced estimates on violence-related deaths covering 191 countries 
for the years 2002 and 2004. From this we create a pooled sample excluding countries with 
populations of less than one million for which data for our independent variables was 
available. The resultant sample consists of 134 countries and 268 observations. The countries 
in our sample account for over 95% of the total world population and 97% of total world 
GDP. This represents a significant step forward in terms of country coverage vis-à-vis 
previous empirical studies of social violence. Appendix B provides a full list of the countries 
included in our sample. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of social violence rates by 
region. It also demonstrates that the characteristics of our sample are comparable to those of 
the whole WHO sample. In our analysis we use the natural log of the social violence rate as 
the dependent variable to account for a non-normal distribution across our sample. 
 
                                                 
5 See UNODC (1999), overview and history sections and http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-
analysis/United-Nations-Surveys-on-Crime-Trends-and-the-Operations-of-Criminal-Justice-Systems.html.   
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Table 1: Regional profiles of deaths due to social violence per 100,000 – 2002 & 2004 (pooled) 
 
Region Countries Observations Mean SD Min Max 
Sub Saharan Africa 36 72 19.36 11.69 2.56 67.95 
Eastern Europe & Central 
Asia 28 56 6.76 6.62 0.78 32.94 
Latin America & Caribbean 22 44 18.32 17.78 0.48 82.63 
North America & W. 
Europe 18 36 1.46 1.16 0.68 5.94 
East Asia & the Pacific 15 30 6.83 6.47 0.54 21.10 
Middle East & North Africa 10 20 3.57 3.07 0.71 11.98 
South Asia 5 10 7.67 3.80 3.55 14.84 
    Our sample 134 268 11.14 12.34 0.48 82.63 
    Total WHO sample 191 382 10.02 11.43 0.21 82.63 
 
Our linear model is structured as follows: 
 
 
 
where β1 represents a vector of political-institutional indices, β2 a vector of socio-economic 
variables, β3 a vector of socio-demographic factors and Xγ is our vector of controls. Our 
political-institutional vector includes two indicators. The first is a dummy variable that 
captures whether or not a country has hybrid political institutions. This is derived from 
Marshall and Jaggers’ (2009) Polity IV database which categorises countries on a 21 point 
scale from fully autocratic to fully democratic regime characteristics based on the nature of 
institutions governing the openness of executive recruitment, competitiveness of executive 
recruitment, constraints on the chief executive and competitiveness of political participation. 
Political regimes have often been classified as autocracies, anocracies (or ‘transitional’) or 
democracies based on where they fall on this 21 point scale. Given that studies vary in what 
numerical values they use to delineate between polity types, and the criticisms of the arbitrary 
nature of coding political regime types using such methods, we employ a recent typology of 
political institutions following Goldstone et al (2010). Based on Polity IV ratings of executive 
recruitment and the competitiveness of political participation, this new typology classifies 
countries into five distinct political regime types: full autocracies, partial autocracies, partial 
democracies, partial democracies with factionalism, and full democracies. We classify 
countries as having hybrid political institutions if they are neither full autocracies nor full 
democracies.6 The second indicator captures the stability of a nation’s political institutional 
regime over time. Drawing on the Polity IV data, we create an index of ‘polity volatility’ 
measured as the log of the total number of changes in a country’s 21 point polity score 
between 1980 and 2000. 7  
                                                 
6 We also include countries at war or in transition (-66, -77 and -88 on the Polity IV scale) in our hybrid dummy 
and refer to these regimes later in the text as ‘transitional’.  Vreeland (2008) has suggested that the common 
practice of coding states at war as transitional regimes artificially inflates the likelihood of transitional states to 
be empirically associated with civil war onset. We acknowledge this as a potential problem for civil war, but less 
of a problem for our study as our dependent variable measures social violence. We ran our models with a hybrid 
polity variable that both included and excluded transitional regimes with no discernable differences.  
7 As we employ this new measure of political institutions, we additionally tested two other measures of political 
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Our socio-economic vector includes indicators of poverty, inequality and economic 
opportunity. Following Goldstone et al (2010) and Pridemore (2008) we use a country’s 
infant mortality rate  (UN 2008b) as a proxy for poverty and log transform values to 
normalise the sample distribution. We make use of the Standardized World Income Inequality 
Database (Solt 2009) for our estimates of inequality. SWIID GINI estimates attempt to correct 
for certain factors that have undermined the comparability across countries and over time of 
similar indices of inequality (Deininger and Squire 1996; UNU-WIDER 2008). The database 
provides two estimates for each country and year: an indicator of ‘gross’ income inequality 
and an indicator of ‘net’ income inequality. The latter indicator factors in the effects of 
taxation on overall income inequality. We use this indicator based on the assumption that net 
inequality is the more relevant issue if the perception of material inequity is the mechanism 
that links inequality to the probability of social violence. Finally, we use the average annual 
growth rate of GDP per capita in the five years prior to the measurement year for each 
observation as an indication of economic opportunity. 
 
For our socio-demographic vector we include a measure of youth as a percentage of the adult 
population (UN, 2006) to test the hypothesis that age structure influences rates of social 
violence. To test the hypothesis that rapid urbanisation may lead to heightened levels of social 
violence we use the average annual urban growth rate for the period 2000-2005 (UN 2008c).  
This is in contrast to several previous studies that purport to test this hypothesis but 
incorrectly use levels of urbanisation as opposed to rates  of urban growth (Fajnzylber et al. 
2000; Fajnzylber et al. 2002a). Our measure of ethnic diversity is a composite index of ethnic 
and linguistic fractionalisation from Alesina et al (2003). 
 
Our controls include a dummy variable that captures whether or not a country is a major 
producer of illegal drugs, following Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (2000). To control for 
the previously observed correlation between war intensity and social violence we include the 
natural log of war deaths for each country and year from the WHO database. To capture 
possible regionally-specific effects that render Latin America and the Caribbean and Sub-
Saharan Africa the most violence regions in the world by far we include regional dummy 
variables. Finally, we include a measure of GDP per capita as a measure of level of economic 
development. Full details of all variables used, time periods covered and sources are shown in 
Appendix A. 
 
 
Results 
Table 2 presents the results of OLS regressions that test each of the three dimensions of our 
model independently. Column 1 tests our hypothesis concerning political-institutional 
configurations using our measures of hybrid political institutions and ‘polity volatility’. 
Column 2 tests our hypotheses concerning social-economic conditions, and includes the log 
of infant mortality rate, GINI, and five-year average rate of GDP growth per capita. We test 
                                                                                                                                                        
institutions as robustness checks. We used Goldstone et al’s (2000) coding of transitional polities countries with 
values from 1 to 7 on the Polity2 score; and also the perceived strength of the rule of law in a country drawn 
from the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators database (Kaufmann et al. 2009) as a perception based 
indicator of political institutional quality. These alternative indicators yielded essentially identical result in terms 
of the magnitude, sign and significance levels of the coefficients, and did not affect other independent or control 
variables in substantive ways.  
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out hypotheses concerning socio-demographic structure with measures of ethnic diversity, 
youth bulge and urban growth rates in column 3. Each of aspect of the model is tested with 
our set of controls. Apart from the unexpected positive, consistent and robust relationship 
between GDP growth and social violence rates, our results are largely consistent with our 
hypotheses.  
 
Political-institutional factors 
Column 1 confirms that countries with hybrid political institutions have higher rates of social 
violence than autocracies or democracies and that past political-institutional volatility is 
robustly correlated with a country’s subsequent rate of social violence. Regarding our control 
variables, the natural log of war deaths and our drug production dummy are positive and 
significant, as expected. We also find GDP per capita to be negatively correlated with social 
violence and the regional dummy variables to be positively correlated.  
 
Socio-economic conditions 
Column 2 tests the relationships between poverty, inequality, economic opportunity and 
social violence. As expected, both poverty and inequality are positively and significantly 
correlated with social violence. However, contrary to our expectations, higher rates of 
economic growth appear to be positively correlated with rates of social violence. There are (at 
least) two possible explanations for this finding. First, it may be a spurious result. The single 
order correlation between per capita GDP growth and social violence rates is insignificant and 
shares some of its variance with logged IMR (-.137), logged GDP per capita (.196) and Gini 
(-.339). Including these variables in a model with GDP growth may be creating a misleading 
result due to issues of multicolinearity. We tested this by running various specifications with 
different combinations of these variables and still found a positive and statistically significant 
correlation—an issue we return to in the discussion. We also note that our control for GDP 
per capita becomes insignificant in this model. Again, this is likely due to a colinearity issue: 
GDP per capita and infant mortality rates are highly correlated (r=-.898)8. We also find that 
our regional dummy variables continue to be significant. 
 
                                                 
8 We ran the model excluding ln GDP per capita with no substantive differences.  
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Table 2: OLS analysis of social violence theory (1) 
 
Dep. Var. = Ln Social Violence Rate 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Hybrid polity 0.630***   
 (0.137)   
Polity volatility 0.108**   
 (0.0492)   
Infant mortality  0.348***  
  (0.106)  
Gini  0.0235***  
  (0.00702)  
GDP growth  0.0629***  
  (0.0166)  
Ethnic diversity   0.975*** 
   (0.249) 
Youth bulge   2.581*** 
   (0.942) 
Urban growth   0.0479 
   (0.0588) 
Ln of GDP per capita -0.134** -0.0742 -0.154* 
 (0.0677) (0.0954) (0.0813) 
Ln of war deaths 0.135*** 0.166*** 0.124** 
 (0.0470) (0.0469) (0.0484) 
Drug production 0.239 -0.0550 0.0163 
 (0.156) (0.158) (0.170) 
LAC 1.001*** 1.058*** 0.990*** 
 (0.153) (0.170) (0.162) 
SSA 1.014*** 0.593*** 0.531*** 
 (0.144) (0.163) (0.171) 
Constant 1.765** -0.172 1.286 
 (0.682) (1.077) (1.002) 
    
Observations 268 268 268 
R-squared 0.599 0.611 0.576 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Socio-demographic structure 
Turning to the socio-demographic component of our theory, Column 3 confirms a positive 
and statistically significant relationship between ethnic diversity and social violence.  This 
result is more consistent with the findings in the criminology literature than the findings of 
civil war studies. We also find that greater youth cohorts in a population are associated with 
an increased likelihood of social violence. However, we find no significant support for the 
theory that countries experiencing rapid urban population growth suffer from higher levels of 
social violence. This result was found to be robust to myriad alternative specifications. Again, 
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our controls for past hybrid political institutions, war-related deaths and regional dummy 
variables are all positive and statistically significant. GDP per capita is negative and 
significant and the drug dummy is insignificant.  
 
Integrated model of social violence 
Table 3 summarises the results of the tests of our general theory of social violence by 
integrating all three model components. Column 1 includes all of our explanatory variables. 
Overall, we find support for each component of our theory with some caveats. Hybrid 
political institutions, political-institutional volatility, infant mortality, inequality and ethnic 
diversity all remain positively and significantly correlated with rates of social violence. By 
contrast, our youth bulge and urban growth measures are insignificant. As in Table 2, GDP 
growth also remains positive and significant, confounding our expectations. With regard to 
our control variables GDP per capita and drug production dummy are insignificant while our 
controls for war-related deaths and regional effects are positive and significant. In Column 2 
we drop all insignificant variables and find an almost identical result in terms of coefficient 
magnitudes and overall model fit. 
 
In Column 3 we examine the insignificant correlation between youth bulge and social 
violence found in Columns 1 and 2. Countries with high infant mortality tend to have high 
fertility rates, high (adult) mortality rates, and hence youth-biased age structures. Our data 
confirms this: infant mortality rates and population age structures are highly correlated 
(r=.898). Column 3 demonstrates that the exclusion of the infant mortality measure renders 
our youth bulge variable positive and statistically significant. 
 
In terms of our control variables, GDP per capita and illicit drug production are found to be 
insignificant while war-related deaths and our regional dummy variables remain highly 
statistically significant across all specifications. With regards to drug production, it may be 
the case that our data is simply too crude to adequately capture the assumed effects of drug 
economies on rates of social violence. The persistently significant correlation between our 
regional dummy variables and social violence indicates that our model is incomplete. We 
expected that political-institutional, socio-economic and socio-demographic factors would 
collectively account for regional differences in rates of social violence. Our results suggest 
that there are some regionally-specific factors (e.g. neighbourhood effects) that we have not 
accounted for. The most surprising result is a consistently positive and statistically significant 
correlation between growth in GDP per capita and rates of social violence. 
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Table 3: OLS analysis of social violence theory (2) 
 
Dep. Var. = Ln Social Violence Rate 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Hybrid Polity 0.393*** 0.377*** 0.397*** 
 (0.140) (0.138) (0.140) 
Polity Volatility 0.085* 0.079* 0.096** 
 (0.048) (0.046) (0.048) 
Infant Mortality 0.255** 0.236***  
 (0.127) (0.065)  
Gini 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 
 (0.0071) (0.007) (0.007) 
GDP growth 0.050*** 0.053*** 0.060*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Ethnic Diversity 0.697*** 0.643*** 0.694*** 
 (0.235) (0.227) (0.229) 
Youth Bulge 0.186  1.75* 
 (1.16)  (0.920) 
Urban Growth 0.058   
 (0.054)   
Ln of GDP per capita  0.059  -0.044 
 (0.096)  (0.084) 
Ln of war deaths 0.142*** 0.144*** 0.151*** 
 (0.045) (0.044) (0.045) 
Drug production -0.082   
 (0.160)   
LAC 0.948*** 0.934*** 0.871*** 
 (0.170) (0.153) (0.156) 
SSA 0.499*** 0.537*** 0.585*** 
 (0.176) (0.162) (0.163) 
Constant -1.62 -0.954*** -0.621 
 (1.11) (0.253) (1.01) 
    
Observations 268 268 268 
R-squared 0.65 0.65 0.65 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Discussion 
While our empirical results are generally consistent with our hypotheses, our statistical 
strategy does not in itself provide an adequate basis for causal inference. With regards to the 
political-institutional hypothesis, there are two possible alternative interpretations of our 
results: high rates of violence promote hybrid political-institutions and political-institutional 
volatility, or some unobserved factor sustains both hybrid political institutions and high rates 
of violence.  
 
High rates of violence can undermine the legitimacy of political institutions and actors, which 
may in turn sustain political volatility (Diamond 1999; LaFree 1998). This weak version of a 
reverse causality argument does not negate our hypothesis. By contrast the stronger argument 
that rising rates of violence may stimulate political-institutional volatility runs directly 
counter to our thesis. There is, however, little evidence that this is the case. For example, the 
1970s was a period of rapid and substantial rises in rates of violent crime in many 
industrialised democracies (Eisner 2008; LaFree and Drass 2002), yet these did not result in 
the de-stabilisation of political institutions. We do acknowledge that there may be some 
chance of a threshold effect, whereby a certain level of violence needs to be reached, and 
perhaps maintained for a certain period of time before political volatility results, but we 
cannot test this using our current dataset. Moreover, we note that our measure of past 
political-institutional volatility is consistently and significantly correlated with present rates of 
social violence. In this case, reverse causality is not a logically plausible explanation, 
although an omitted variable bias cannot be ruled out. 
 
The argument for a causal link between political institutions and social violence is further 
strengthened when we consider the complex relationships between our dependent variable 
and our various explanatory variables within the broader context of development theory. As 
noted in the introduction, high levels of violence generate a variety of social costs. Bates 
(2001) has argued that these costs can be sufficiently high to impede socio-economic 
development and are only overcome where a state manages to establish a monopoly over the 
legitimate use of violence within its territory. Once this political order is achieved individuals 
are able to direct resources away from personal defence and enforcement and towards 
investment, and reduced uncertainty about the future security of investments encourages them 
to do so. In sum, Bates outlines a causal chain that runs from political order to reduced 
violence to economic development. Our data are certainly consistent with this hypothesis. 
Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of the relationships between political regime type, 
social violence and GDP per capita. The solid line represents the mean violence rate of 
country clusters according to their raw polity score. The dotted line represents GDP per capita 
plotted in the same way. 
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Figure 1: Relationships between violence, wealth and political institutions 
 
 
The near perfect inverse relationship between regime type and violence (on the one hand) and 
regime type and income (on the other) provides a striking graphical indication of strong links 
between these variables, consistent with the theory. However, given that the raw polity scale 
cannot be considered continuous, it is difficult to infer what kinds of political-institutional 
arrangements are most prone to violence. The shape of the curves indicates that the poorest 
and most violent countries are those with hybrid political institutions (falling in the middle of 
the scale), while strong autocracies and democracies (at either pole) exhibit less violence and 
higher incomes. This is consistent with the longstanding hypothesis that strong, coherent 
political institutions are good for growth, whether or not they reflect democratic values—
although the least violent and wealthiest countries in the world tend to be strong 
democracies.9  
                                                 
9 Huntington (2006 [1968]) argued that the maintenance of political order requires ‘strong, adaptable, coherent 
political institutions’ and that ‘the differences between democracy and dictatorship are less than the differences 
between those countries whose politics embodies consensus, community, legitimacy, organization, effectiveness, 
stability, and those countries whose politics is deficient in these qualities’ (1).  
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Table 4: Regime type and social violence 
 
  Polity type Observations Mean SD Min Max 
Full Democracy 66 2.69 2.99 0.54 13.70 
Full Autocracy 15 6.11 4.78 2.11 21.05 
Partial Autocracy 56 12.66 8.54 1.09 32.89 
Partial Democracy 80 13.77 12.47 0.48 67.95 
‘Transitional’ 13 16.00 16.42 1.87 52.41 
Partial Democracy w/ 
Factions 38 18.32 18.17 2.70 82.63 
 
Table 4 provides a more nuanced picture by summarising mean rates of social violence 
according to the six regime types used to construct the dummy variable of hybrid political 
institutions. As expected, strong democracies and strong autocracies have the lowest rates of 
social violence, while intermediate regimes have higher rates of violence. Notably, partial 
democracies—and especially those that have factional political competition—have the highest 
rates of violence (alongside ‘transitional’ regimes). This provides a clue as to why armed 
rebellions are apparently in decline and social violence on the rise. The proliferation of 
democracies following the end of the Cold War has resulted in the channelling of political 
contestation through (weak) democratic institutions. Institutionalised political contestation in 
the absence of institutionalised self-restraint may stimulate sporadic acts of violence between 
individuals and groups aligned with opposing political factions without fomenting organised 
armed rebellions. 
 
The story becomes more complicated when we consider the causal relationships between 
socio-economic factors and social violence. If political order suppresses violence, paves the 
way for investment and growth and reduces poverty, a virtuous cycle of falling violence and 
falling poverty may ensue assuming that escape from poverty lessens incentives for 
individuals to engage in violent behaviour. Conversely, a vicious cycle of high levels of 
inequality and high rates of violence may be hypothesised. The costs of violence fall hardest 
on the poorest strata of society, who tend not only to be the primary perpetrators of violence 
but also the primary victims. As a result, violence ensnares the poorest, while those with the 
means to insure themselves against the worst consequences of violence (e.g. with private 
security and medical care) may be able to steadily improve their lot, thereby exacerbating 
overall social inequality. In other words, there may be endogenous relationships between 
violence, poverty and inequality that we are unable to identify with the data and methods 
employed here.  
 
Similarly, the correlation observed between poverty and youth bulges noted above raises the 
possibility that a link between youth bulges and violence found in previous studies may be 
due to inadequate controls for poverty. However, the close correlation between the two makes 
it difficult to tease apart independent effects given the data and methods used here.  
 
The most puzzling question that emerges from our results is why higher rates of economic 
growth—all other things equal—are robustly correlated with higher rates of social violence. 
One explanation could be derived from the ‘modernisation’ perspective: rapid growth is 
socially disruptive, eroding norms of self-restraint. Alternatively, it may be the case that 
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rapidly growing countries experience rising inequality and social strain; our data 
unfortunately do not permit a test of this hypothesis. It may be the case that political order 
reduces violence and sets the stage for growth, but that rapid growth (in the short run) 
exacerbates social tensions and stimulates violence—a potential concern for rapidly 
modernising countries such as India and China. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Civil wars, which have recently received substantial academic attention, are rare and 
destructive. By contrast, social violence is widespread and possibly represents an equally 
significant threat to socio-economic development. Development scholars should therefore 
devote more attention to understanding the causes and consequences of social violence.  
 
Our results suggest that political violence and social violence share at least one common 
underlying cause: hybrid political institutions. Hybrid political institutions create uncertainty 
about the basis of legitimate authority in a society and undermine state capacity to maintain 
the rule of law. This can create spaces for insurgent activities, force individuals and groups to 
bear the burden of directly defending their interests, inhibit economic growth and undermine a 
state’s capacity to deliver public goods, further exacerbating the conditions of poverty and 
inequality that drive people to commit violent acts. Moreover, democratic institutions may 
lessen the risk of organised armed rebellions but increase the risk of social violence where 
these institutions are weak. Overall, our results indicate that the establishment and 
maintenance of a stable political order is a first-order condition for reducing social violence 
and cultivating norms of self-restraint. This paves the way for economic development, 
which—if managed well—can reduce poverty and alleviate inequality, diminishing incentives 
for individuals and groups to choose to engage in violent behaviour.    
 
Further research is needed to clarify the specific mechanisms that link macro-level political 
institutions to everyday violence. In the case of ethnic diversity, for example, the failure of 
political institutions to effectively mediate conflicts between ethnic factions or ameliorate 
horizontal inequalities may explain the strong correlation we find between ethnic diversity 
and violence. Perhaps most importantly, however, we need to look beyond the current 
theoretical and empirical consensus that institutions are important determinants of 
development. The next step is to understand why and how societies arrive at political 
settlements that result in stable and coherent political-institutional regimes. 
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Appendix A: Variable Descriptions and Sources 
 
Variable Description Time 
period 
Source 
Ln Social 
Violence Rate 
The natural log of deaths due to intentional 
injury per 100,00 population. 
2002 
&2004 
(WHO 2004, 2008) 
Hybrid Polity Based on the Polity2 variable from the PolityIV 
dataset, with missing values susbstited with the 
Kristian Skrede Gleditsch’s Modified Polity2 
score. Coded as a dummy variable coded as 1 if 
Polity2 score took a value between 0 and 7 
inclusive. 
2002 & 
2004 
Authors’  calculation from 
(Skrede Gleditsch 2008; Marshall 
and Jaggers 2009) 
Rule of Law Rule of Law variable from the World Bank’s 
World Governance Indicators dataset, 1996-
2008. The indicator captures ‘perceptions of the 
extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, 
the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence’. 
2002 & 
2004 
(Kaufmann et al. 2009) 
Political 
Volatility 
The natural log of the sum of the absolute 
number of points change in the Polity2 score, 
1980-2000 
1980-
2000* 
Authors’ calculation from (Skrede 
Gleditsch 2008; Marshall and 
Jaggers 2009) 
Infant 
Mortality 
The natural log of the Infant Mortality Rate 2000-
2005* 
(UN 2008b) 
GINI  The GINI Net score from the Standardised 
World Income Inequality Dataset 
2002 & 
2004 or 
nearest 
year(s) 
(Solt 2009) 
GDP per 
capita growth  
Annual growth of real GDP per capita (constant 
prices, Laspeyres method), 2005 international 
dollar equivalent from the Penn World Tables 
6.3 
2002 & 
2004 
(Heston et al. 2009) 
Ethnic 
Diversity 
Ethnic and Linguistic Fractionalization score 
from Alesina et al (missing values for Yemen 
added from Roeder’s ELF1985) 
Constant
* 
(Alesina et al. 2003; Roeder 2001) 
Youth Bulge Youth population as a proportion of the total 
adult population, calculated as the population 
aged 15-24 as a percentage of the population 
aged 15 and over. 
2000-
2005* 
(UN 2008a) 
Urban 
Growth  
Annual percentage change in the urban 
population. 
2000-
2005* 
(UN 2008c) 
Hybrid Polity 
(lagged) 
The average Polity2 score for the years 1980-
1989 
1980-
1989* 
Authors’ calculation from (Skrede 
Gleditsch 2008; Marshall and 
Jaggers 2009) 
GDP per 
capita 
The natural log of real GDP per capita (constant 
prices, Laspeyres method), 2005 international 
dollar equivalent 
2002 & 
2004 
(Heston et al. 2009) 
War Deaths 
Rate 
The natural log of deaths due to intentional 
injury per 100,00 population. 
2002 & 
2004 
(WHO 2004, 2008) 
Drug 
Production 
Dummy variable coded 1 if a country was listed 
as one of the US government’s ‘Major Illicit 
Drug Producing and Transit Countries’ for any 
year from 2000-2005 
2000-
2005* 
International Narcotics Control 
Strategy Reports, 2000-2005 
Regional 
Dummies 
Dummy variable according to World Bank 
classification of world regions 
Constant
* 
(WorldBank 2008) 
 
Note:  An* indicates the value on that variable is the same for observations in both 2002 and 2004. 
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Appendix B: Countries included in our sample, 2002 & 2004 
 
North America 
& Western 
Europe 
Austria 
Belgium 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
United States  
 
East Asia & 
Pacific 
Australia 
Cambodia 
China 
Indonesia 
Japan 
Laos 
Malaysia 
Mongolia 
New Zealand 
Papua New 
Guinea 
Philippines 
Singapore 
South Korea 
Thailand 
Vietnam 
 
 
Eastern Europe 
& Central Asia 
Albania 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Czech Republic 
Estonia 
Georgia 
Hungary 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Macedonia 
Moldova 
Poland 
Rumania 
Russia 
Serbia & 
Montenegro 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Tajikistan 
Turkey 
Turkmenistan 
Ukraine 
Uzbekistan 
 
South Asia 
Bangladesh 
India 
Nepal 
Pakistan 
Sri Lanka 
 
 
 
Latin America & 
the Caribbean 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Cuba 
Dominican 
Republic 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Jamaica 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
 
Middle East &  
North Africa 
Algeria 
Egypt 
Iran 
Iraq 
Israel 
Jordan 
Lebanon 
Morocco 
Tunisia 
Yemen 
 
 
 
Sub Saharan  
Africa 
Benin 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Central African 
Republic 
Cote D’Ivoire 
Ethiopia 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Kenya 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Somalia 
South Africa 
Sudan 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
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Appendix C: Correlation Coefficients for Dependent, Independent and Control Variables 
 
 
Ln 
Social 
Viol-
ence 
Rate 
Hybrid 
Polity 
Rule of 
Law 
Polity 
Vola- 
tility 
Ln 
Infant 
mort- 
ality 
Gini GDP 
growth 
Ethnic 
diver-
sity 
Youth 
Bulge 
Urban 
growth 
Hybrid 
Polity 
(lag) 
Ln of 
GDP 
per 
capita 
Ln War 
deaths 
Rate 
Drug 
produc-
tion 
LAC SSA 
                 
Ln Social Violence Rate 1                
Hybrid Polity 0.3951 1               
Rule of Law -0.6678 -0.3832 1              
Polity Volatility 0.4581 0.2887 -0.5596 1             
Ln Infant mortality 0.6703 0.368 -0.8018 0.479 1            
Gini 0.5965 0.2087 -0.4297 0.2334 0.5481 1           
GDP growth -0.108 -0.0601 0.1048 0.061 -0.1373 -0.3386 1          
Ethnic diversity 0.5348 0.262 -0.4353 0.3131 0.5457 0.3277 -0.1125 1         
Youth Bulge 0.6496 0.2849 -0.7066 0.3792 0.8988 0.6242 -0.2528 0.4763 1        
Urban growth 0.3567 0.1727 -0.3435 0.1638 0.4633 0.3152 -0.0607 0.1742 0.4907 1       
Hybrid Polity (lagged) 0.1876 0.1397 -0.0108 0.0466 0.0583 0.3745 -0.1254 0.0074 0.1148 0.0583 1      
Ln of GDP per capita -0.6081 -0.4202 0.786 -0.5202 -0.8979 -0.4433 0.1955 -0.5191 -0.825 -0.4489 0.0183 1     
Ln War deaths Rate 0.3264 0.2533 -0.442 0.1414 0.3655 0.1878 -0.2146 0.2744 0.3172 0.2379 -0.0683 -0.4091 1    
Drug production 0.1958 -0.0155 -0.234 0.0595 0.1167 0.2729 -0.0449 0.0728 0.1695 0.2465 0.1441 -0.0754 -0.0362 1   
LAC 0.2544 -0.0285 -0.1515 0.0996 -0.0521 0.3515 -0.2042 -0.0198 0.1042 0.0264 0.2548 0.06 -0.1407 0.5293 1  
SSA 0.5018 0.2793 -0.3412 0.2222 0.6612 0.4506 -0.2102 0.565 0.5949 0.3443 -0.0287 -0.6168 0.288 -0.215 -0.2686 1 
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